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US Department of Commerce Issues Regulations to Restrict Remote Cloud Access 

Read Time: 14 min

CONTRIBUTORS

Amir R. Ghavi

Partner, Tech Transactions

Roberto J. Gonzalez

Partner, Investigations & White Collar Defense

Sam Kleiner

Partner, Investigations & White Collar Defense

Quinn Dang

Of Counsel, Investigations & White Collar Defense

Talya Hutchison

Of Counsel, Investigations & White Collar Defense

On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a new interim final rule, “Addressing Remote Access to Advanced Semiconductors” (the “IFR”), that is one of the most significant uses of export controls to have the effect of restricting remote access to most advanced computing items (e.g., GPUs). The IFR accomplishes this goal utilizing a few existing export-control mechanisms, including by requiring companies that provide access to compute above a certain threshold to Chinese companies (and companies in 21 other arms-embargoed countries) to obtain a license or otherwise risk their ability to secure future exports of advanced computing items. In practical terms, data centers in countries such as France or Singapore (i.e., countries not generally subject to heightened export control restrictions) may now be subject to an export license requirement for procurement of advanced-computing items when they were not previously if they have Chinese customer offtake. 

The 131-page IFR issued by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) also formally repeals the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule by replacing the AI Diffusion Rule’s worldwide export restrictions with license requirements for exports to Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. The IFR is among the most significant export control measures undertaken in the current administration and has far-reaching impacts for companies across the AI stack, particularly in infrastructure.

The rule is issued as an “interim final rule” and will be effective (and binding) immediately upon official publication in the Federal Register (which is expected on November 19, 2026). BIS is accepting comments on the rule for 60 days after publication. There is a savings clause for shipments en route aboard a carrier if the export is completed within 30 days of publication. 

1. Export Regulations that Restrict Cloud Access for Chinese Companies

Remote Access Restrictions for Chinese Companies. The IFR adds a license requirement for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of advanced computing items subject to the EAR when there is “knowledge” at the time of export, reexport, or in-country transfer that the item is destined to a data center to or within any destination worldwide that is providing or will provide access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate total processing performance (“TPP”), either in one data center or through linked data centers, “to or for companies” headquartered in, or whose parent is headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, which is a list of 22 arms-embargoed countries that includes China.[1] 

Although the new end-use restriction does not explicitly state that the data center must be overseas, under the regulations the license requirement applies only to overseas data centers because there must be an export of advanced computing items (i.e., a physical shipment of GPUs to a location outside the United States).

In short, U.S. exporters must apply for a license where a transaction contemplates providing over 12,000,000 TPP of compute (roughly 98 GB300s) to a data center located outside the United States where it has knowledge that Chinese customers would have access to such U.S. GPUs, whether for training or running of AI models.

BIS explains in its preamble that it received inquiries regarding the meaning of the phrase “for an entity” (referencing a 2023 BIS rule[2] restricting exports of advanced computing items “for an entity” that is headquartered in or whose parent is headquartered in Country Group D:5[3] ). The preamble states that the 2023 restriction was meant to ensure that rules were not undermined by “Country Group D:5 headquartered entities setting up cloud servers or data centers in other countries to allow these entities of concern to continue to train their SI[4] models in ways that would be contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.” This restriction “is not, and has never” been limited to shipments destined to such entities as ultimate consignees or end users, but rather extends to exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) “on behalf of these entities of concern, e.g., if an entity of concern was the purchaser in the transaction (directly or indirectly) or was the exclusive or primary (greater than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of the data center computing capacity.” Thus, BIS encourages exporters to examine end-use controls under both the current restrictions and new restrictions to determine whether there is knowledge that a Country Group D:5-headquartered company is an intended remote end user. (The IFR states that any entities in violation of this requirement should submit a voluntary self-disclosure.)

The only limited exception exists for providing access to compute in connection with “commercial recommender systems,”[5] such as those used by online retailers and social media companies, but only when a submission is made to the End User Review Committee providing, among other things, the name of the company, the total compute power provided, and due diligence performed to ensure that access is “exclusively” being provided for commercial recommender systems.[6] 

Running and Training of Models. The preamble to the IFR explains that the rule prevents the use of advanced computing items in data centers and at computing power levels that “can be used for training or running” of advanced artificial intelligence models, and that providing access to high computing power can be used to “train or run” AI models capable of supporting military and intelligence-related activities “that could threaten U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.”

The IFR is significant in reaching beyond training of models, as compared to the current regulations and guidance, such as the BIS AI Policy Statement issued on May 13, 2025, which have traditionally focused on concerns regarding provision of access to GPUs in furtherance of training of Chinese models. The reference to restrictions on access to compute for “running” of models in the preamble represents a significant change in policy. The IFR does not define “running” and does not specifically address whether the rule is referring to token/API in addition to inferencing.

Applies to Training of Models by Non-Chinese Customers. BIS explains in the preamble that the term restrictions under current regulations for exports “for an entity” headquartered or whose parent is headquartered in a D:5 country includes instances where there is “knowledge” that a data center is providing remote access to a non-D:5 customer (e.g., a customer headquartered in Europe) that is, in turn, training AI models, or “participating” in the training of AI models for, or “providing” AI models to, a D:5 company. 

Data Centers Currently Serving Chinese Customers. Data centers that are currently serving Chinese customers are not grandfathered in under the IFR. Instead, any data center providing a “significant volume of compute power” to companies headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, a D:5 country prior to the rule that wishes to continue to provide these services must obtain a license “within 90 days of the effective date of the IFR or face future export restrictions.”[7] Such licenses will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Practically speaking, this restriction means that data centers failing to obtain a license in furtherance of their activities providing such compute to companies headquartered in China face the inability to procure additional advanced-computing items.

KYC Requirements. Companies are expected “to obtain and be able to provide sufficient information from the foreign data center regarding the data center’s ‘know your customer’ due diligence checks.”[8] BIS expects such diligence checks to include diligence on whether “any data center customer” is subject to “direct or indirect ownership and control” by companies headquartered in Country Group D:5 or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in Country Group D:5. A foreign data center declining or being unable to provide information sufficient to verify compliance with end-use controls under the remote access provisions is considered a “red flag that presumptively provides you with ‘knowledge’ unless you are able to resolve that red flag before proceeding with the transaction.” BIS explains that this diligence requirement “will ensure that companies cannot circumvent new controls through corporate restructuring or spinoffs.” Moreover, KYC is required of “data centers, foreign foundries, and chip exporters.”[9] 

Is-Informed Letters. BIS may exercise its authority to inform persons, either individually or by specific notice or through amendment to the EAR, that a license is required for the export of specific items to certain persons or destinations because there is an unacceptable risk of diversion.[10] This authority — known as “is-informed” authority — allows BIS to inform companies individually or publish in the Federal Register a license requirement for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) of any item subject to the EAR because there is an unacceptable risk of use in, or diversion to, a “military-intelligence end use” in Belarus, Burma, Cambodia, China, Russia, or Venezuela, or for a Belarusian, Burmese, Cambodian, Chinese, Russian, or Venezuelan “military-intelligence end user,” among others.

Notably, the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[11] may notify the Secretary of Commerce that “certain destination is at high risk of use in, or diversion to, the activities specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section [regarding exports of advanced computing items for use in data centers for end uses and destinations of concern].” The inclusion of the Secretary of State and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in identifying diversion risks is notable because it adds other equities into a process that has traditionally been administered by the Department of Commerce and could signal more actions to come, either informally through an “is-informed” notice or through additional license requirements. 

2. License Requirements for Export of Advanced Computing Items to Southeast Asia and Brazil

Advanced Computing Item Exports. Based on a determination regarding potential diversion risks, a license will be required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) advanced semiconductors to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, or Brazil (and any other country designated by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).[12] Licenses will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the transaction is contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and will be evaluated based on the effectiveness of the destination’s export control regime and its coordination with BIS on the enforcement of export controls.

U.S.-Headquartered Companies. The license requirements will not apply to advanced computing items exported to an ultimate consignee or end user headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, the United States, provided a monthly report (due no later than the first business day of the month following the transaction) is submitted regarding any transaction subject to these provisions.[13] 

The reporting requirements to qualify for this exclusion include: information on all parties involved in the transaction, including name, physical address, mailing address, phone number, and information for all parent company headquarters; the role each party is playing in the transaction; the ultimate destinations of the commodities being exported and any “end user” who is not the ultimate consignee; and information on products being exported, including ECCN, product name and SKU, TPP, and quantity of the product.

What Companies Should Consider Doing Now

  1. US Data Centers. Although the preamble refers to data centers “wherever located,” the IFR’s restrictions are effectuated through requirements related to “exports” (or reexports or in-country transfers) of advanced computing items, which do not exist with respect to U.S. data centers. Nonetheless, the IFR and the current geopolitical climate could raise heightened risks for U.S. companies providing access to Chinese companies within the United States, and U.S. companies may opt to take a more restrictive view than what is required under the regulations, especially when such U.S. data centers might in the future require replacement of existing GPUs.
  1. Existing Data Centers Serving Chinese Customers. Existing data centers that serve Chinese customers above the 12 million TPP threshold must obtain a license to continue to provide cloud access to Chinese customers, or otherwise risk future restrictions on advanced computing-item procurement. Even data centers that do not currently operate pursuant to export licenses should take care to consider this new requirement and evaluate if regulatory engagement is needed.
  1. Who Is Affected. Data center operators (including those in Europe and Asia), cloud providers, Chinese and other users of those services, and funds with data center exposure should look at this new rule closely. In practice, this guidance is particularly salient for those located in Southeast Asia, where a Chinese-headquartered customer (or a customer serving one) may be using GPUs for AI training or inference.
  2. Contracts. Offtake and capacity contracts should be reviewed to determine whether the rule is a regulatory change event, and how it might impact licensing, reporting, or commercial obligations.

The Paul Hastings export controls team has been advising companies on export regulations related to advanced computing items since the earliest introduction of such relevant export controls and is closely evaluating the practical and commercial implications of the IFR. Our attorneys are ready to advise on the potential impacts for companies across the AI ecosystem, from hyperscalers, neocloud providers, and data center operators to financial institutions and AI customers and end users.

References

1.

15 C.F.R. § 744.24(a)(1) (Prohibition on exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) for certain advanced computing items for use in data centers for end uses of concern.) China, under U.S. export regulations, is interpreted to include Hong Kong. See Removal of Hong Kong as a Separate Destination Under the Export Administration Regulations, 85 Fed. Reg. 83765 (Dec. 23, 2020).

2.

Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections, 88 Fed. Reg. 73458 (Oct. 25, 2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/25/2023-23055/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-items-supercomputer-and

3.

15 C.F.R. § 744.23(a)(3)(i).

4.

Consistent with Executive Order 14434’s direction to federal agencies, the IFR refers to “super intelligence” or “SI” in place of “artificial intelligence” and “AI.”

5.

“Commercial recommender system” means “a Super Intelligence (SI) tool exclusively designed and exclusively used to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content to users based on user behavior, transaction history, or item attributes. This term does not include any SI system designed or used to generate novel text, image, audio, video, software, or other content in response to user inputs, or any system that incorporates such model, regardless of whether the system also performs recommendation functions.”

6.

15 C.F.R. § 744.24(b)(2)(iii).

7.

15 C.F.R. § 744.23(a)(3).

8.

15 C.F.R. § 744.24(a)(1), Note 3 to paragraph (a)(1).

9.

Preamble to IFR at p. 1.

10.

15 C.F.R. § 744.24(a)(2). 

11.

Previously called the National Security Adviser.

12.

15 C.F.R. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1).

13.

15 C.F.R. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), Note 1.