Addressing Gaps and Inconsistencies in the EU Sanctions’ Enforcement: The Commission Urges Member States to Transpose Directive (EU) 2024/1226

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has adopted 18 packages of sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus, with the latest on July 19, 2025.

In total, the EU has about 40 different sanctions regimes in place, including those mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The nature of sanctions enforcement — whether administrative or criminal — depends on the legal system of each Member State.

Until last year, the lack of a comprehensive and unified enforcement framework allowed entities to exploit discrepancies between Member States’ enforcement regimes. Even not ill-intentioned entities faced uncertainty, as assessing the risks of cross-border transactions was mainly state-dependent, resulting in inconsistent compliance and a lack of a unique point of entry for reporting and escalating.

Directive (EU) 2024/1226 (the Directive), adopted on April 24, 2024, aimed not only to strengthen sanctions practical enforcement, but also to provide greater legal predictability for EU operators.

Harmonizing and Sharpening the Enforcement of Sanctions

Under the Directive, all Member States must now treat intentional violations — and in some cases, those committed with serious negligence — as criminal offences. (Breaches involving less than €10,000 may be excluded from criminal offenses.)

The Directive sets minimum rules for defining criminal offenses and penalties (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 3). Inciting, aiding and abetting as well as attempts to commit some of these offenses should also be criminally sanctioned (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 4(2)).

One of the major changes of the Directive is the imposition of harmonized minimum penalties, which result in significant increased legal risks in comparison with certain existing national regimes, especially for legal persons.[1] Member States must now impose maximum fines of at least 1% to 5% of global turnover, depending on the breach, or €8-40 million.

In assessing these offenses, Member States should consider one or several of the aggravating (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 8) and mitigating (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 9) factors detailed in the Directive (e.g., destruction of evidence). It should be noted that the Directive allows “special investigative tools” — such as those used in combating organized crime — to be used for the investigation and prosecution of these offenses.

Overall, the Directive represents a decisive step toward harmonizing the application of EU restrictive measures and strengthening their deterrent effect.

From EU to National Law: The Urge for Transposition

The short-term transposition deadline of May 20, 2025, has now passed, and Member States have largely failed to implement the Directive to date.

On July 24, 2025, the European Commission indicated that it has decided to open infringement procedures by sending a letter of formal notice to 18 Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia) for failing to notify measures fully transposing the Directive. The concerned Member States now have two months to respond, complete their transposition and notify their measures to the commission.

Indeed, taking a deeper look at the transposition status, as of July 25, 2025:

• The Netherlands considered that its legislation was already compliant with the Directive’s requirements[2] and was not targeted by the commission.

• On May 7, 2025, the Swedish Parliament adopted the government's bill implementing the Directive, which entered into force on June 10, 2025. Aggravated or repeated violations of EU restrictive measures are now punishable by two to six years' imprisonment (Articles 8 and 9 of the law (2025 :327) on international sanctions). Sweden was also excluded from the commission’s letter of formal notice.
• The Spanish Council of Ministers approved a draft bill on March 25, 2025, which was under public consultation until the beginning of April. The bill does not appear to have been formally adopted at the date of this article.
• The German government did prepare a draft bill raising maximum penalties to a maximum of €40 million that was under committee deliberations prior to legislative elections were held in March 2025 — it is yet to be confirmed whether the newly elected house will draft a new law or continue with this draft.
• France has only passed a decree on May 28, 2025, transposing Article 15 of the Directive that requires Member States to designate, among their competent authorities, a body responsible for coordinating and facilitating cooperation between law enforcement authorities and the authorities implementing EU restrictive measures.[3] The transposition in France would significantly raise maximum penalties for legal persons and might raise challenges in relation to transposing the concept of “serious negligence,” which was only recently introduced into French criminal law — and so far, solely within the framework of environmental criminal law.
• In Italy, a new law was published in June 2025 to transpose the Directive, though the implementing decrees remain outstanding.
• Some other Member States, such as Portugal, have yet to disclose the measures they plan to take for transposition.
• Lastly, it should be noted the draft bill submitted by Denmark on March 7, 2025, has not been adopted yet (noting that Denmark has opted out on these matters).

In the meantime, Member States are supposed to collect statistical data regarding the prosecution of the violation of EU restrictive measures and submit a report to the commission on a yearly basis (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 17).

Toward a Centralized Prosecution Authority?

The adoption of this Directive highlights a broader structural gap within the European enforcement framework: the absence of a centralized EU-level prosecution authority specifically dedicated to the enforcement of restrictive measures.

Currently, entities that become aware of breaches have no easy single point of entry at the European level to which they can report such violations. This fragmented approach poses challenges, particularly when potential breaches span multiple Member States, as there is no streamlined process to address or settle such cross-border cases through a unified EU mechanism. The Directive merely proclaims that it is encouraging competent authorities in the Member States affected by a cross-border offense to refer relevant information to “appropriate competent bodies” and underscores the importance of cooperation among national authorities as well as with EU-level bodies such as Europol, Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) (Directive (EU) 2024/1226, Article 16).

Perhaps, European institutions might look into the creation of a single prosecution authority solely dedicated to restrictive measures, or into the extension of the EPPOs missions.

Some more voices now appear to favor the latter option, to allow building on the EPPO’s recent experience in relation to the protection of the European Union’s financial interests. In an opinion piece, the French and German ministers of justice emphasized the importance of such a reform, which would align with the expansion of “eurocrimes” to include violations of EU sanctions. This proposal has also been supported by groups within the European Parliament, as well as voices at the EPPO itself.

In any event, a shift toward centralized enforcement would be a significant step and could offer a consistent point of reference for companies seeking guidance or facing internal issues related to potential violations of EU law, as well as enhance both the coherence of the EU’s judicial landscape and the effective enforcement of sanctions. However, such a step will be politically challenging. Article 86 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires any extension of the EPPO’s missions to be approved by a unanimous decision of the European Council.